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Chantal BENÔIT-BARNE
University of Colorado
at Boulder, Department of Communication, and CITIDEP Canada.
Campus Box 270, Boulder, CO 80309-0270, USA. E-mail: chantal.benoit-barne@colorado.edu
ABSTRACT
This paper calls our attention to the need of modernizing our views of the public sphere and investigating how our increasing reliance on communication technologies to mediate social interactions influences the formation of publics. Here a public is defined as an association of strangers united by an awareness of their commonalities. This union creates a potential for collective actions and a capacity to actively influence the state of our society. Framed by this definition and a discussion of the processes by which publics are formed, the paper then outlines some of the main questions to consider when studying the influence of communication technologies to mediate the formation of publics. These questions relate to our capacity to 1) develop shared conditions, interests and purposes, 2) uncover these commonalities, and 3) develop an awareness of forming a public capable of action. Most theories of public sphere are oblivious to the fact that, in contemporary western societies, communication technologies mediate many aspects of public life. This omission may be attributed to the fact that pre-modern societies relying on direct forms of communication, such as the Hellenic polis, the Roman republica, the 18th century French salon, and the English coffeehouse have provided the grounding for many of our current theories of public life (see Arendt, 1958; Sennett, 1978; Habermas, 1989). While there is no question that unmediated forms of communication are still typical of modern public life, it would be restrictive to describe modern democratic societies solely in terms of these interactions for they have been increasingly complemented by new forms of mediated social interactions. The aim of this paper is to a) call our attention to the significance of studying the formation of publics in a mediated world and b) outline some issues to consider when investigating the implications of the use of communication technologies to mediate social interactions for the constitution of publics.
At a time when democracy seems to emerge as the form of governance par excellence, a better understanding of how publics are formed in modern western societies (societies characterized by an increasing reliance on communication technologies) is long overdue for at least two reasons.
First, an appreciation of the formation of publics is central to our understanding of public life in democratic societies. Public sphere theory, an interdisciplinary line of research aimed at theorizing the characteristics of public life in democratic polity, posits the existence of publics capable of critically analyzing perspectives brought to their attention and, through discussion, to form a public opinion that can govern state action. Often inscribed by a normative ideal, these theories propose a model of public life that can favor the functioning of contemporary democratic societies characterized by conditions of diversity and inclusion. Underlying this model is the core belief that our society is [should be] governed by publics willing and capable of discursively negotiating individual differences. We call "public sphere" the realm of their discussions.
Second, if we ascribe to a discursive view of the public sphere (as the author of this paper does), the formation of publics becomes the sine qua non of public life. A discursive view of the public sphere posits that "talk" is one of the primary means of coordination necessary to public life. While the term public sphere as "a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed" (Habermas, 1974, p. 49) refers to a space in which public life can unfold, a discursive view implies that the construct cannot be limited to this topographical dimension alone. On the contrary, to understand the complex function of the public sphere in contemporary democratic societies, we must foremost consider its discursive dimension.
From a discursive view, a public sphere implies a) a space where the discussion of public issues may take place, b) social agents that come together as a public because of a shared interests and c) the emergence of a common understanding that can be used to guide civic actions. In sum, a discursive understanding of the public sphere implies both a realm where our discussion of public interests can take place and a realm of our social life created through discussion (the realm of our common understanding). These two dimensions may seem difficult to conciliate yet they are complementary in the sense that public life relies on the existence of a space (actual or virtual) enabling individuals to discuss their common interests but this space is only the first condition and is in no way sufficient to the unfolding of public life. Public life relies mainly on discourse and, most specifically, on the existence of a public capable of forming public opinion and common understanding though talk.
In this, it is not the act of gathering in a public space but the union among strangers that can result from their communicative interactions in such a gathering that characterizes the public sphere. This is to say, for instance, that a public square is not a public sphere in and of itself, nor does the fact that individuals gather within the square endow this square with the status of a public sphere. The square, because it allows for such a gathering, has the potential of becoming a public sphere, but whether or not this potential is fulfilled depends on the individuals gathering within it and the nature of their interaction. In sum, it depends on their capacity to discover their commonalities through talk or, stated differently, to form public(s).
The discursive dimension of the public sphere is made explicit by Habermas (1974) when he claims that "a portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body" (p. 49). Other scholars of the public sphere, such as Hauser, have also made this discursive dimension explicit in their definitions (see also the works of Bitzer, 1978; Fraser, 1992; Goodnight, 1982). Hauser (1999) describes the public sphere as "a discursive space in which strangers discuss issues they perceive to [be] of consequence for them and their group. Its rhetorical exchanges are the basis for shared awareness of common issues, shared interests, tendencies of extent and strength of difference and agreement, and self-constitution as a public whose opinions bear on the organization of society" (p. 105).
As illustrated by Hauser's definition, an emphasis on discourse establishes the formation of publics through talk as the sine qua non of public life. It suggests that if we want to better understand the state of public life in modern democratic societies, we must pay closer attention to the conditions of modernity and to their implications for the formation of publics. This paper calls our attention to one of these conditions: our increasing reliance on communication technologies to mediate social interactions.
In order to outline some of the issues to consider when investigating the formation of publics in a mediated world, we must now turn to the concept of a public per se. What exactly do we mean by a public? While the terminology is widely used, few scholars have actually defined their use of this concept. Relying on the works of Dewey, Bitzer, and Hauser, I here describe a public as an association of strangers united by an awareness of their commonalities. This union creates a potential for collective actions and a capacity to actively influence the state of our society.
In his 1927 book The Public and its Problems, Dewey argues that strangers constitute a public because of a shared condition and a shared interest in addressing their condition. More specifically, strangers constitute a public when they share the indirect consequences of the acts of others: "The public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for" (p. 15-16). Dewey bases this definition on the premise that individual acts have two types of consequence upon others: Direct consequences are "those which affect the person directly engaged in a transaction," while indirect consequences are "those which affect others beyond those immediately concerned" (p. 12). For Dewey, direct consequences characterize private acts while indirect consequences define public acts and warrant the formation of a public.
In sum, in order for a public to constitute itself, individuals must be able to perceive the indirect consequences they share and identify the agency of the indirect consequences they suffer. This suggests that the indirect consequences must be "lasting, extensive and serious" (Dewey, 1927, p. 67) and that those affected by them can ascertain their origin.
With this definition, Dewey emphasizes that publics are formed based on commonalities (individuals sharing the indirect consequences of the acts of others and an interest in addressing these effects), but his definition does not suggest that individuals constituting a public actively participate in its formation. On the contrary, their membership is described as a by-product of the indirect consequences of the acts of others. This passivity is called into question by Bitzer's (1978) view of a public as an association of individuals united by a form of knowledge which is partly inherited and partly of their own making.
Bitzer (1978) argues that a public is characterized by both commonalities and interdependence: "a public is a community of persons who share conceptions, principles, interests, and values, and who are significantly interdependent" (p. 68). These commonalities constitute a "public knowledge" whose function is to provide a public with a basis for attributing new "truth and values" and for legitimating "decision and action" (p. 68). Bitzer explains: "In the absence of this knowledge, there is no genuine public, but only an artificial one consisting of a population held together by such forces as coercive regulations and unchangeable boundaries" (p. 88).
Public knowledge consists of "principles of public life to which we submit as conditions of living together; shared interests and aspirations; values which embody our common goals and virtues; our constitutions, laws, and rules; definition and conceptual systems, truths expressed in literatures or poetry, criticism, philosophy, aesthetics, politics, and science; the accumulated wisdom proffered by our cultural pasts; and, to these, we add the personal facts of our public life" (Bitzer, 1978, p. 87). Thus, public knowledge is partly inherited, partly developed through social interactions. When a public loses touch with the inherited components of its knowledge or when it is unable to develop its knowledge through interactions, the public loses some of its actuality. When, on the contrary, a public "learn[s], rehearse[s], and celebrate[s] what it knows" (p. 88) and members of the public partake in the formation of public knowledge through social interactions, it gains substance and authority. In sum, with Bitzer, we see how members of a society actively partake in the formation of publics.
Hauser (1999) complements this view when he suggests that individuals constitute a public when they become aware of their shared conditions through talk. According to Hauser, individuals form a public when they "discuss issues they perceive to be of consequence for them and their group" (p. 105) and when, through shared interaction or discourse, they "discover their interests, where they converge or differ, and how their differences might be accommodated" (p. 103). In short, while Dewey's definition suggests an unconscious membership in publics and Bitzer's definition posits an active yet not necessarily conscious membership in publics, Hauser's definition clearly implies that publics are formed in the process of individuals gaining an awareness of their commonalities. Thus, the formation of publics does not solely depend on the presence of individuals sharing an interest in addressing certain effects or on the existence of a common knowledge, but also on the occurrence that, through rhetorical exchanges, strangers gain consciousness of the things they hold in common; or, to use Hauser's words, of their "shared interests, tendencies of extent and strength of difference and agreement, and self-constitution as a public whose opinions bear on the organization of society" (p. 105).
The consciousness of not being alone, of other strangers sharing similar concerns, creates a potential for collective action. This potential for collective action relates to the function of publics in our society. Publics are central to democratic societies because they can act: They can engage in critical discussion, form opinions, persuade, vote, manifest, boycott, etc. They can influence society and guide state actions in a way that most individuals alone can't. However, whether or not a public is active does not affect its essence. Passive strangers aware of their commonalities will remain "a public," albeit an apathetic one.
Thus, the main question we face when studying the formation of publics in a mediated world is not whether or not these publics are active and thus fulfilling their social function, but rather whether or not strangers using communication technologies to mediate their social interactions are capable of generating this potential for action by uncovering their shared conditions.
ISSUES TO CONSIDER WHEN STUDYING THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE FORMATION OF PUBLICS
Based on the above discussion of the nature of publics and the processes by which they are formed, we can start outlining some of the issues to consider when investigating the role of communication technologies in the formation of publics. More specifically, we can develop research questions related to the effects of technological mediation on our capacity to: 1) develop shared conditions, interests and purposes, 2) uncover these commonalities, and 3) gain awareness of forming a public capable of action:
1. How the use of communication technologies to mediate social interactions influences our capacity to develop commonalities:
* Does it expand the range of possible experiences to the extent that strangers have generally less in common?
Does it increase interdependence and interactions among strangers to the extent that we develop a common base of experiences sufficiently strong and relevant to become the basis of a "global" public?
Does it foster fragmentation based on specialization by multiplying the range of possible experiences and promoting the development of commonalities with those already involved in similar interactions?
Does it generate new types of commonalities?
2. How the use of communication technologies to mediate social interactions influence our capacity to uncover our commonalities:
* Does it open up/forecloses opportunities to engage in discussion?
Does the type of discussion it allows advance/hinder the uncovering of our shared conditions and interests?
Does it replace "discussion" as the preferred means of uncovering our commonalities?
3. How our use of communication technologies to mediate social interactions influences our awareness of forming a public capable of action:
Does it effect the nature of the link among members of a public?
If it does, are these connections lasting and extensive enough to sustain an active public?
This outline of fundamental questions about the role of communication technologies in the formation of publics does not pretend to be exhaustive. It merely constitutes a first step in the investigation of the formation of publics in a mediated world and will hopefully be used to guide future investigations.
In 1927, Dewey called our attention to the need of studying how "the machine age" influenced the formation of publics. He then posited that the public was in "eclipse" because individuals could not identify and distinguish the indirect consequences they suffer. He argued that this eclipse was a consequence of our increasing reliance on technology, what he called "the machine age":
"The machine age has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified and complicated the scope of the indirect consequences, has formed such immense and consolidated unions in action, on an impersonal rather than a community basis, that the resultant public cannot identify and distinguish itself." (p. 126).
Dewey's observations were made 72 years ago, in a world in which mediation was not yet a central feature of public life. It is now time to modernize our views of the public sphere and to start asking how our ways of forming publics in a mediated world have evolved.
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